Bridging Agendas, Testing Boundaries
Observations from the UNFCCC SB62 Just Transition Work Programme Negotiation
By Manav Khanna, Lauren Hermanus and Anthony Dane
WHY JUST TRANSITIONS MATTER?
As the global climate crisis escalates, the imperative to integrate equity into climate action has never been more urgent. The Just Transition agenda responds to this by asking: how can climate action be fair, inclusive, equitable and developmentally aligned? Yet this seemingly straightforward question forces us to confront deep challenges, particularly with respect to how just transitions are defined, resourced, and implemented across domestic, regional, and international contexts. The UNFCCC’s Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP)¹ was launched in response to these challenges. It aims to provide structure and momentum to the operationalisation of Just Transitions, ensuring that the shift to low-carbon societies does not deepen existing inequalities within or between countries.
As negotiators and observers gathered in Bonn for the 62nd sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB62) in the runup to COP30 — the “Implementation COP” — one of the most dynamic throughlines for the JTWP contact group was the question of synergies between the just transition agenda and other critical climate action agendas. These synergies are emerging within the wider UNFCCC architecture, with other international and regional bodies, and in relation to national development frameworks and institutions. As expected, the technical discussion aiming to develop draft decision text for the JTWP for COP30 involved robust negotiations over ownership, scope, and influence in shaping and operationalising the work of the JTWP.
1. FROM PREAMBLES TO PARAGRAPH 28²: A CONTESTED TEXT
Paragraph 28³ of the text under discussion became a flashpoint. Para 28 determines the future of implementation of JTWP, providing three distinct options. At the onset of SB62, the first option essentially continues with current approaches, “existing modalities”, while strengthening their implementation. The second opened the door to establishing new institutional arrangements, including options such as a global platform, technical assistance network, a toolbox, or guidance framework to support country-level transitions. The third option suggested deferring any substantial decisions until 2026.These options reflected deeper questions around political will, institutional ambition, and the pace at which just transitions should be formalised under the UNFCCC. Parties negotiated whether to keep multiple options on the table, merge them, or discard some entirely. The Group of 77 and China (G77 + China)⁴, supported by its many subgroups Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs⁵), African Group of Negotiators (AGN⁶) Least Developed Countries (LDCs)⁷, and Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)⁸, favoured merging Options 1 and 2. On the other hand, countries like the UK, New Zealand, and Canada preferred a “no text” or more narrowly scoped approach, citing duplication (for example, they proposed issues like Means of Implementation (MOI) are covered The New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), and The Global Stocktake (GST) and lack of clarity. In contrast, the developing countries do not see these issues as fully addressed within the UNFCCC. Substantive tensions emerged over how expansive or limited the role the JTWP should be. While some Parties, including Bolivia, South Africa, and India, pushed to expand references to MOI, international cooperation, and institutional arrangements, others such as the EU and UK cautioned against overreach and suggested on tighter alignment with existing mandates.
2. SYNERGIES OR OVERLAPS? THE LIMITS OF INSTITUTIONAL COORDINATION
The very idea of “synergies” was interpreted differently across parties. Some countries, including Norway, Canada, and Kenya, saw value in aligning the JTWP with existing work streams within UNFCCC (e.g., the Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures (KCI), Adaptation Fund, GST). Others, like India and China, pushed for recognition of external institutional linkages, including the ILO, WTO, and UNCTAD. Related to this discussion, the issue of how best to address “cross-border impact⁹” and “unilateral measures¹⁰” also divided Parties. The push for integration beyond the UNFCC, as well as a more robust consideration of the actions of Parties on one another within the transition, raises questions regarding the role of the JTWP, and the UNFCCC more broadly. Namely, should the JTWP merely reflect existing UNFCCC processes, or should it shape them? Should it raise climate ambitions through top-down prescriptions, or should it enable climate action through more ambitious international cooperation?
3. CO-CHAIRS AS BRIDGE-BUILDERS
An important and often under-acknowledged aspect of these discussions has been the role of the co-chairs. At the UNFCCC, co-chairs are appointed to lead specific work programmes and dialogues, with one representative from the Global North and one from the Global South. These co-chairs facilitate discussions, guide negotiations, and help bridge divergent Party perspectives. Throughout the contact group meetings, the JTWP co-chairs demonstrated careful stewardship facilitating space for divergent views, introducing informal notes to structure discussions, and tactfully steering debate around contentious placeholders like Paragraph 28. Their experience from evolving negotiations of the Just Transition WP was evident, particularly in how they encouraged generative reflection on options rather than forcing consensus prematurely. As discussions advance toward COP30, their role will remain pivotal in helping Parties navigate complexity without losing the overall ambition of the JTWP.
4. MULTILATERAL PRINCIPLES UNDER PRESSURE
Many Parties reiterated their commitment to Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC), the primary framing for equity within the UNFCCC. These parties acknowledge that while all states are accountable for addressing human-driven climate change and environmental degradation, certain countries have historically contributed more to the crisis and are in a better financial position to act, due to longstanding global economic inequalities.
As noted above, this issue was framed by some parties at a domestic level while others, emphasised the international dynamics. To illustrate, the Arab Group members (e.g., Kuwait, Qatar) and Bolivia emphasized the adverse impacts of unilateral climate measures while insisting on language that anchored just transitions in national sovereignty and development needs. Others, including some observer constituencies went even furtherby warning that too much focus on national sovereignty could be used to avoid stronger international commitments on climate justice. Additionally, countries like Mexico, Colombia, and the Marshall Islands highlighted the need to embed human rights, Indigenous peoples’ rights, and intergenerational equity arguing that justice must not only be nationally defined but also globally inclusive.
5. OBSERVER VOICES: CIVIL SOCIETY FILLING THE GAPS
While negotiations became increasingly involved in nuanced divergences, observer constituencies offered clarity by highlighting critical issues and parameters.
Trade unions reminded the group that social dialogue is not an optional add-on, it's a legal obligation under CMA decisions.
Youth and gender constituencies called for a holistic approach that recognizes unpaid labour, youth agency, and intersectional inequalities.
Indigenous Peoples’ organizations emphasized historical injustices in mining and land use, advocating for precautionary language and self-determination.
Their interventions helped re-anchor the discussion in lived realities and pointed to the need for inclusive implementation beyond technical language.
6. WHAT’S NEXT? GATHERING THE THREADS TOGETHER
As Parties prepare for further discussions moving toward Belem and COP30, one key question remains: Can this work programme deliver convergence without dilution? The JTWP’s potential to serve as a platform for sharing experiences, enhancing implementation, and enabling international cooperation depends on how well it can navigate developed and developing countries’ needs and priorities while advancing the key goals and objectives of the work programme. The SB62 conversations offer a snapshot of both the growing political weight of just transitions and the still-fragile consensus on what that means in practice.
As the JTWP moves toward COP30, it faces a pivotal test: can it move beyond dialogue and become a vehicle for real transformation? At its core, the JTWP holds enormous potential, not only to share experiences and build trust but to tackle the hard questions of equity, capacity, and capabilities in climate action.
So far, much of the discussion has centred on formats, language, and institutional fit. But the deeper promise of the JTWP lies elsewhere: in its ability to highlight justice as a structural condition for ambitious climate action. This means not just improving existing modalities but reimagining the role of international cooperation, support systems, and global governance in enabling equitable transitions. Equity matters because transitions will not look the same everywhere. They will be shaped by vastly different starting points, resources, and development needs. Recognising this and building a work programme that actively addresses such asymmetries is not just politically necessary, it is a condition for success. If Parties can rise to this moment, the JTWP could evolve into a cornerstone of the Paris Agreement’s promise: delivering climate action that is not only fast, but fair, inclusive and equitable.
¹ More information on the United Arab Emirates Just Transition Work Programme is available.
² Information on Options for further implementation of the United Arab Emirates just transition work programme are available.
³ Information on Paragraph 28 text reads as follows:
“Option 1: Improving existing modalities
Option 2: New institutional arrangements [toolbox, guidance framework, global platform, technical assistance network, mechanism]
Option 3: Defer decision to 2026”
⁴ The G77 is a coalition of developing nations, officially known as the Group of 77, and China is not a full member but a strong supporter and often participates in G77 initiatives. The G77, established in 1964, now includes 134 member states, representing approximately 80% of the world's population. The "and China" designation signifies China's alignment with the group's goals and its active participation in promoting the collective interests of developing countries.
⁵ The LMDC is a group of developing nations that act as a bloc in international negotiations, particularly within organizations like the United Nations and the World Trade Organization. They represent over half the world's population and focus on maintaining the differentiation between developed and developing countries.
⁶ The AGN consists of climate change negotiators of every African country. One country is selected to chair the group for a period of two years.
⁷ LDC is a classification by the UN for nations with low income and severe development challenges.
⁸ AOSIS represents the interests of the 39 small island and low-lying coastal developing states in international climate change, sustainable development negotiations and processes. As a voice for the vulnerable, its mandate is more than amplifying marginalized voices as it also advocates for these countries’ interests.
⁹ Impact of implementation of response measures as explained by UNFCCC, “Impacts of implementation of response measures is understood as the effects arising from the implementation of mitigation policies, programmes and actions, “in-jurisdiction” and “out-of-jurisdiction” or cross-border impacts, taken by Parties under the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement to combat climate change. To achieve the 2oC goal of the Paris Agreement (and even more so the 1.5oC) requires enhanced ambition and effective implementation of GHG mitigation abatement policies and actions. It is thus imperative that there is an urgent need to assess, analyze, address and report these cross-border environmental, social and economic impacts. These impacts could be positive or negative, therefore the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement seek to minimize the negative and maximize the positive impacts of implementation of mitigation policies and actions. Parties shall take into full consideration, in the implementation of the commitments of the Convention, the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from the impact of the implementation of response measures.”.
¹⁰ Unilateral trade measures in the context of measures to address climate change, “Unilateral trade measures involve actions taken by a single country or a group of countries to restrict or alter trade practices based on environmental standards, aiming to incentivise foreign nations to adopt cleaner practices or penalise those that do not.”